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STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN UNITED STATES SUITS TO
RECOVER OIL SPILL CLEANUP COSTS UNDER
THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT
INTRODUCTION
Oil spills from vessels' and onshore and offshore facilities2 cause exten-
sive water pollution damage in the United States.' As part of a scheme
to remedy this problem, Congress passed section 311 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).4 Section 311 enables the
United States to remove an oil spill from domestic waters if the President
determines that the removal will not be done properly by the owner or
1. For the purposes of § 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, "'vessel'
means every description of watercraft. . . used, as a means of transportation on water."
33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(3) (1982).
2. An onshore facility is "any facility (including, but not limited to, motor vehicles
and rolling stock) of any kind located in, on, or under, any land within the United
States." Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311(a)(10), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(10)
(1982). An offshore facility is "any facility of any kind located in, on, or under, any of
the navigable waters of the United States, and any facility of any kind which is subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States and is located in, on, or under any other waters." Id.
§ 1321(a)(11).
3. Over 13,000 spills each year account for 20 million gallons of oil and hazardous
substances entering United States waterways. Environmental Protection Agency, Oil
Spills and Spills of Hazardous Substances 1 (1975). Environmental damage resulting
from such spills includes mortality to seabirds and fish and damage to intertidal orga-
nisms, plant life, algae and salt marshes. Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of
the United States, Oil Transportation by Tankers: An Analysis of Marine Pollution and
Safety Measures 31 (1975). Spills may inflict severe economic damage on the fishing,
shellfish and tourist industries. See Tanker Safety in Alaska. Hearings on S. 182, S. 568,
S. 682, S. 715 and S. 898 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transpor-
tation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1049-60 (1977) (statements of Phillip Daniel and Bob Blake,
representatives of professional fishermen's organizations) (voicing apprehensions of fish-
ing industry); Oil Pollution Liability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and
Navigation of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representa-
tives, on H.R. 776, H.R. 1827, H.R. 1900, H.R. 3711 and H.R. 3926, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
116-17 (1977) (written statement of Marc Guerin, State of Maine Dep't of Environmental
Protection) (oil spills adversely affect the tourist industry); Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, The State of the Environment in OECD Member Coun-
tries 61 (1979) (economic damage from oil pollution includes impairment of fishing and
shellfish farming and losses in hotel and tourist trades). Oil spills also threaten personal
injury and damage to property, see Environmental Protection Agency, supra, at 15, 17,
are expensive to remove, id. at 1, and degrade the quality of life of effected communities,
see Oil Spillage-Santa Barbara, Calif., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Flood Control
and Subcomm. on Rivers and Harbors of the Comm on Public Works of the House of
Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1969) (statement of Gerald S. Firestone, Mayor
of Santa Barbara, Cal.). For an account of the impact of one of the worst oil spills in
history, see R. Petrow, In the Wake of Torrey Canyon (1968).
4. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816, 862-71 (1972) (current version at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321 (1982)). For an overview of the liability scheme of the FWPCA, see generally
Wood, Requiring Polluters to Pay for Aquatic Natural Resources Destroyed by Oil Pollu-
tion, 8 Nat. Resources Law. 545, 555-57 (1976); Note, Oil Spills and Cleanup Bill- Fed-
eral Recovery of Oil Spill Cleanup Costs, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1761 (1980); Comment,
Spilling Oil May be Hazardous to Your Wealth, 19 Nat. Resources J. 735 (1979).
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operator of the polluting vessel or facility.5 The United States may re-
cover, within limits,6 the costs incurred in removing the oil and in re-
storing or replacing natural resources damaged by the spill.7
The FWPCA mandates no time within which the government must
commence an action to recover cleanup costs, and no federal statute ex-
pressly sets forth a time limit for government suits based on federal statu-
tory rights of action.' Section 2415 of the Judicial Code, however,
contains a general statute of limitations for actions brought by the United
States.9 Section 2415(a) provides that actions for money damages
"founded upon any contract express or implied in law or fact" must be
commenced within six years after accrual of the right of action. ° Sec-
tion 2415(b) provides that actions for damages "founded upon a tort"
must be commenced within three years."I
Some courts have held that section 311 actions are quasi-contractual in
nature and are therefore governed by the six year limit.12 They reasoned
that because polluters have unjustly benefited from government cleanups,
actions for cleanup costs are restitutionary in nature.1 3 Other courts
have concluded that actions for cleanup costs are not quasi-contractual
for limitations purposes because there is no language of agreement in the
statute, because the cleanups benefit the public, not polluters, 4 or be-
cause the government has a duty to remove oil spills. 5 Those courts
held that these actions are founded on tort and are therefore subject to
5. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1) (1982).
6. The maximum liability for vessel owners and operators is limited and depends on
the size of the vessel. See id. § 1321(0(1). Liability for owners and operators of onshore
and offshore facilities is limited to $50 million. Id. § 1321(0(2), (3).
7. Id. § 1321(0.
8. See United States v. The Barge Shamrock, 635 F.2d 1108, 1110 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981).
9. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2415 (West Supp. June 1984).
10. Id. § 2415(a). The term "contract implied in law" is a synonym for quasi-con-
tract. See United States v. Limbs, 524 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1975); Union Cent. Life
Ins. Co. v. Glasscock, 270 Ky. 750, 758-59, 110 S.W.2d 681, 686 (1937) (quoting Kellum
v. Browning's Adm'r, 231 Ky. 308, 319-20, 21 S.W.2d 459, 465 (1929)); Thomas v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. 262, 266, 38 A.2d 61, 63 (1944); 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 19, at 44 (1963). Section 2415(a) was intended to extend to obligations based
on quasi-contracts. See H.R. Rep. No. 1534, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966). Contracts
implied in fact are true contracts. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 1-12
(2d ed. 1977).
11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2415(b) (West Supp. June 1984).
12. See United States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364, 374 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Healy Tibbitts Constr. Co., No. C-83-3072, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Cal. May 1,
1984); United States v. C & R Trucking, 537 F. Supp. 1080, 1082-83 (N.D. W. Va. 1982);
United States v. Poughkeepsie Hous. Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1998, slip op. at 7-8 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 16, 1981).
13. See United States v. C & R Trucking, 537 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (N.D. W. Va.
1982); United States v. Poughkeepsie Hous. Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1998, slip op. at 8-9
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1981).
14. See United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., No. A84-108 Civil, slip op. at 9-10 (D.
Alaska Nov. 8, 1984).
15. See United States v. The Barge Shamrock, 58 [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. (Mar. L.
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the three year limit of section 2415(b). 16
Part I of this Note maintains that the courts have been correct in ap-
plying section 2415 to government actions based on statutes such as the
FWPCA. Part II argues that courts should apply section 2415(a)'s six
year limit to government actions for oil spill removal costs because the
polluter's obligation to pay is quasi-contractual in nature.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
Before determining which provision of section 2415 applies to the gov-
ernment's cause of action under the FWPCA, it must be determined
whether it is appropriate at all to apply section 2415 to government
rights of action created by federal statutes. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity dictates that the United States as plaintiff is never bound by
any statute of limitations unless Congress has expressed its intent that
the United States be so bound.17 In 1966, Congress passed the general
statute of limitations provision for actions by the United States. 8 By
their terms, subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 2415 provide statutes of
limitations for government suits based on actions "founded upon" tort, 9
contract or quasi-contract.20 Courts have construed this language to
limit the time within which the government may bring actions based on
federal statutory rights that can be characterized as one of these common
law causes of action.21 Thus, whether section 2415 applies to section 311
Ass'n) 1921, 1923 n.2 (D. Md. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir.
1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981).
16. See United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., No. A84-108 Civil, slip op. at 11-12
(D. Alaska Nov. 8, 1984); United States v. The Barge Shamrock, 58 [1980] Am. Mar.
Cas. (Mar. L. Ass'n) 1921, 1923-24 (D. Md. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1108
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981). This position was also taken in a
Southern District of Texas case which was reversed by the Fifth Circuit. See United
States v. P/B STCO 213, 569 F. Supp. 743, 744 (S.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd, 756 F.2d 364 (5th
Cir. 1985). The split in authority has been noted in Water Quality Committee, 17 Nat.
Resources Law. 277, 285 (1984) (1983 Report on significant developments).
17. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938); United States v.
City of Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1081
(1981). This doctrine finds its continuing vitality in the policy of preserving public rights,
revenues and property from losses due to the negligence of public servants. Guaranty
Trust Co., 304 U.S. at 132; City of Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d at 339-40.
18. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-505, 80 Stat. 304 (current version at 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 2415-2416 (Vest 1978 & Supp. June 1984)).
19. "[E]very action for money damages brought by the United States or an officer or
agency thereof which is founded upon a tort shall be barred unless the complaint is filed
within three years after the right of action first accrues ... " 28 U.S.C.A. § 2415(b)
(West Supp. June 1984).
20. "[E]very action for money damages brought by the United States or an officer or
agency thereof which is founded upon any contract express or implied in law or fact, shall
be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action accrues
.... " 28 U.S.C.A. § 2415(a) (West Supp. June 1984).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Limbs, 524 F.2d 799, 801 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Boyd, 520 F.2d 642, 644-45 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United
States v. Reinhardt College, 597 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (N.D. Ga. 1983); United States v.
Vicon Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1578, 1580 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. M/V Alva,
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of the FWPCA depends on whether the government action for cleanup
costs can be so characterized.22
The government has argued that because the FWPCA cause of action
is founded on the commerce clause powers of Congress, characterization
is inappropriate and therefore section 2415 should not apply at all.23 The
statute's language, legislative history and policies show that the courts
have correctly applied section 2415 to federal statutory rights of action of
the United States, even though those rights are based on constitutional
powers.
Section 2415 contains the words "founded upon any contract" and
"founded upon a tort."' 24 Had Congress intended to waive immunity
only for torts, contracts and quasi-contracts, it could have clearly said so.
If section 2415 is read so narrowly as to apply only to those causes of
action that fit squarely into common law categories, the words "founded
upon" would be left without meaning. These words indicate that Con-
gress used these common law categories to refer to the facts underlying
the actions, rather than to the common law legal theories.25
Other language from section 2415 supports the conclusion that it
should be applied whenever possible to government causes of action
based on statutes. Section 2415 expressly removes from its coverage all
claims of the United States under the Internal Revenue Code.2 6 The spe-
505 F. Supp. 109, 110 (E.D. La. 1981); Forrester v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1157,
1158 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
22. Some courts have applied no limitation provision when the statutory cause of
action could not be characterized under a part of § 2415. See United States v. City of
Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d 337, 340-41 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981);
United States v. Lutheran Medical Center, 524 F. Supp. 421, 424-26 (D. Neb. 1981),
aff'd, 680 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982); cf United States v. Hannon, 728 F.2d 142, 145 (2d
Cir. 1984) (actions on judgments); United States v. Kellum, 523 F.2d 1284, 1287 (5th
Cir. 1975) (same); Cracco v. Cox, 66 A.D.2d 447, 449, 414 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405-06 (1979)
(foreclosure actions). But see United States v. Neidorf, 522 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1975)
(whenever the United States sues, claims must be characterized as tort, contract or quasi-
contract), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976).
23. United States v. P/B STCO 213, 569 F. Supp. 743, 744 (S.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 756 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1985); see United States v. The Barge Shamrock, 58
[1980] Am. Mar. Cas. (Mar. L. Ass'n) 1921, 1922 (D. Md. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
635 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981); cf United States v.
Central Soya, Inc., 697 F.2d 165, 169 (7th Cir. 1982) (similar argument in action under
the Rivers and Harbors Act). A similar argument advanced by the government is that
the FWPCA was intended to create a new system of liability and that therefore no time
bar should apply. See United States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364, 376 (5th Cir. 1985).
This argument fails for the same reasons as does the government's commerce clause argu-
ment. See infra notes 24-45 and accompanying text.
24. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2415(a), (b) (West Supp. June 1984).
25. Effect must be given to every word of a statute. United States v. Menasche, 348
U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882)); Na-
tional Ass'n of Recycling Indus. v. ICC, 660 F.2d 795, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 2A N.
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 104 (C. Sands rev. 4th ed. 1984).
No part should be left inoperative or superfluous. National Ass'n, 660 F.2d at 799; 2A
N. Singer, supra, § 46.06, at 104.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(h) (1982).
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cific exclusion of one type of statutory government action from section
2415's purview implies a congressional recognition that the statute would
be applied to other government rights of action based on statutes. 27
Therefore, all other federal statutory rights of action of the government
should, if possible, be characterized as one of the kinds of action enumer-
ated in section 2415.28
Although the legislative history of section 2415 provides no clear
meaning for the words "founded upon,",29 an examination of the policies
underlying the statute shows that its time limitations should be applied to
government suits based on federal statutory rights. By eliminating sover-
eign immunity with respect to limitations, Congress intended to put the
government on an equal footing with other litigants,30 encourage prompt
collection of government claims31 and reduce the cost of record keep-
ing.32 Excluding federal statutory rights of action from the operation of
section 2415 would frustrate the expressed will of Congress by reducing
the number of suits included in the statute's scope.
The general rules for applying state statutes of limitations to federal
rights of action provide further support for construing section 2415 to
control government rights of action under federal statutes. Although
Congress may create a right of action without limiting the time to exer-
cise the right,33 the general rule when a federal statute specifies no statute
of limitations is to apply the most applicable state statute of limitations to
27. When a statute expressly enumerates exceptions from its operation, it should be
construed to apply to all other nonenumerated cases within the same class. 2A N. Singer,
supra note 25, § 47.11, at 145; see Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Train,
507 F.2d 743, 747 (10th Cir. 1974) ("where there be express exceptions to a statute,
additional exceptions by implication are not favored"), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 1
(1976).
28. Cf United States v. Limbs, 524 F.2d 799, 801 (9th Cir. 1975) (when the United
States sues, the court must characterize claims as tort, contract or quasi-contract).
29. This choice of language was not explained by the committee reports, by the spon-
sor of the legislation, or during the House subcommittee hearing. See Improvement of
Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government Litigation: Hearing Before Subcomm.
No. 2 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House ofRepresentatives on H.. 13652, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5-11 (1966) (statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, Dep't of Justice); S. Rep. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2502; H.R. Rep. No. 1534, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); 112
Cong. Rec. 14,378 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin); 112 Cong. Rec 6876 (1966) (same).
30. See S. Rep. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2502, 2503; H.R. Rep. No. 1534, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1966); 112 Cong.
Rec. 14,378, 14,380 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin); see also Crown Coat Front Co. v.
United States, 386 U.S. 503, 521 n.14 (1967) (Congress intended to equalize the positions
of government and private litigants).
31. See S. Rep. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2502, 2513-14; 112 Cong. Rec. 14,378 (1966) (statement of Sen.
Ervin).
32. See H.R. Rep. No. 1534, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966); 112 Cong. Rec. 14,378
(1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
33. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); United States v.
Lutheran Medical Center, 524 F. Supp. 421, 424 (D. Neb. 1981), aff'd, 680 F.2d 1211
(8th Cir. 1982).
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the federal claim.34 When a state has a limitations provision for liabilities
created by statute, federal courts sitting in that state typically will apply
that statute of limitations to federally created statutory rights of action."5
When appropriate,36 federal courts will apply either the tort or contract
statute of limitations of that state.3 7 When the United States is a plain-
34. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975) (Tennes-
see statute of limitations applied to civil rights claim); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696, 704-05, 707 (1966) (Indiana statute of limitations applied to action under
Labor Management Relations Act); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 465-68 (1947)
(Kentucky limitation applied to action under the National Bank Act); Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397-99 (1906) (Tennessee limita-
tion applied to treble damages action under the Sherman Act); Campbell v. Haverhill,
155 U.S. 610, 613-20 (1895) (Massachusetts limitation applied to action under tile Patent
Act). See generally Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 Colum. L.
Rev. 68 (1953) (reviewing application of state limitations to federal statutory claims)
[hereinafter cited as Federal Statutes]; Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitations,
63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1266-67 (1950) (same) [hereinafter cited as Developments in Law];
Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 265 (1963) (same). Federal courts borrow the state statute of limi-
tations most consistent with the policies of the federal statute, see Board of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980); Johnson, 421 U.S. at 462, by choosing the limitations
statute for analogous types of actions, see Board of Regents, 446 U.S. at 488. Courts may
not, however, use a state statute of limitations inconsistent with federal policy. See John-
son, 421 U.S. at 465.
35. See, e.g., Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463-64 (1947); Occhino v. United
States, 686 F.2d 1302, 1307-08 (8th Cir. 1982); Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108, 110 (9th
Cir. 1981); Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 861-66 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 649 F.2d 658, 662-63 (9th Cir.
1980); Martin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 568 F.2d 58, 63-64 (8th Cir. 1977); Bireline v.
Seagondollar, 567 F.2d 260, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979);
Mason v. Schaub, 564 F.2d 308, 309 (9th Cir. 1977); Burns v. Union Pac. R.R., 564 F.2d
20, 21-22 (8th Cir. 1977); Chambers v. Omaha Pub. School Dist., 536 F.2d 222, 228 (8th
Cir. 1976); Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 517 F.2d 520, 521-22 (6th Cir. 1975); Garner v.
Stephens, 460 F.2d 1144, 1148 (6th Cir. 1972); Nevels v. Wilson, 423 F.2d 691, 691-92
(5th Cir. 1970); Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220, 223 (D. Colo. 1966); Greenbie v.
Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); see also Federal Statutes, supra note 33, at 69
& n. 11 (citing federal cases applying state limitations for liabilities created by statute);
Note, Fair Representation by a Union: A Federal Right in Need of a Federal Statute of
Limitations, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 896, 905 (1983) (federal courts borrow state limitations
for federal statutory claims) [hereinafter cited as Fair Representation]; Note, Limitation
Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1127, 1134 (1979) (same) [hereinafter
cited as Limitation Borrowing ]. But see Bell v. Aerodex, Inc., 473 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir.
1973) (applying Florida's statute of limitations for recovery of wages rather than limit for
rights created by statute); McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 429 F. Supp.
359, 366 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (declining to apply Georgia's 20 year limitation in a securities
fraud case), rev'd on other grounds, 598 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1979).
36. "A seaman takes his employment, like his fun, where he finds it." Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 588 (1953).
37. See, e.g., Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 651 (10th Cir.) (limitation for personal
injuries applied to civil rights claims), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 79 (1984); Prince v. Wal-
lace, 568 F.2d 1176, 1178 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (same); Page v. United States
Indus., 556 F.2d 346, 351-52 (5th Cir. 1977) (limitation for torts applied to civil rights
claim), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978); Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289, 1294 (5th
Cir. 1976) (limitation for contracts applied to civil rights claim); Douglass v. Glenn E.
Hinton Invs., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1971) (limitation for fraud applied to
securities fraud claim); Wilson v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 600 F. Supp. 671, 675-76
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (limitation for products liability applied to action under Consumer Prod-
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tiff, this analysis is precluded because sovereign immunity dictates that
the government is not bound by state statutes of limitations.38 Thus, sec-
tion 2415 takes the place of state statutes of limitations.3 9 The same
analysis leading to application of state limitations to nongovernment fed-
eral claims should be used for section 2415.1 Only those government
claims based on statutes which cannot be characterized as tort, contract
or quasi-contract, and which are not limited by another provision of sec-
tion 2415 or another statute, should be exempt from time limits.
4
'
uct Safety Act); Haynes v. O'Connell, 599 F. Supp. 59, 61-62 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (limita-
tion for contracts applied to action under ERISA and Labor Management Relations Act
for pension benefits); Holmes v. Bateson, 434 F. Supp. 1365, 1379 (D.RtI. 1977) (limita-
tion for contracts applied to Securities Exchange Act of 1934), affid in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 583 F.2d 542 (1st Cir. 1978); Harris v. Pennsylvania, 419 F. Supp. 10,
14 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (limitation for personal injuries applied to civil rights claim); Federal
Statutes, supra note 34, at 70; cf Bell v. Aerodex, Inc., 473 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1973)
(applying Florida's limitation for actions for wages rather than one for liabilities created
by statute to an action under the Military Selective Service Act). But cf Diamond v.
LaMotte, 709 F.2d 1419, 1424 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying, in a securities fraud case,
Georgia's Blue Sky limitation rather than limitation for fraud). The application of state
limitations to federal rights has not led to uniform rules. See Fair Representation, supra
note 35, at 907-08; Limitation Borrowing, supra note 35, at 1136-40. Courts have also
applied catchall provisions that set limitations for all actions not otherwise provided for.
See Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400, 405-06 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (civil rights), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 998 (1982); Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 336-38 (7th Cir. 1977) (same),
cert denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978); Lassiter v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 162 F.2d 774, 776-77
(Fair Labor Standards Act), vacated on other grounds, 166 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1947) (per
curiam); Bill's Crane Serv., Inc. v. Quisenberry, 545 F. Supp. 359, 361-62 (D. Hawaii
1982) (civil rights); Christensen v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 446, 450 (D.
Utah 1950) (antitrust); MeDuffie v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 755, 760 (E.D.
Ill. 1947) (Fair Labor Standards Act). There is no such catchall provision in § 2415.
38. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
39. One of the major purposes of § 2415 was to remedy the unfairness caused by
sovereign immunity. See S. Rep. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1966
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2502, 2503; H.R. Rep. No. 1534, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4
(1966); 112 Cong. Ree. 14,378 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin); see also United States v.
Central Soya, Inc., 697 F.2d 165, 168-69 (7th Cir. 1982) (§ 2415 was intended to remedy
government's immunity from state limitations).
40. See United States v. Neidorf, 522 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1087 (1976).
41. Courts have consistently applied § 2415 to the government's statutory claims by
characterizing such claims as tort, contract or quasi-contract. See United States v. P/B
STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364, 368-74 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Limbs, 524 F.2d 799,
801 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Neidorf, 522 F.2d 916, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); United States v. State Farm Ins. Co., 599 F. Supp. 441, 446
(E.D. Mich. 1984); United States v. Reinhardt College, 597 F. Supp. 522, 525 (N.D. Ga.
1983); United States v. Vicon Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1578, 1579-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
United States v. C & R Trucking, 537 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (N.D. W. Va. 1982); Forrester
v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1157, 1158 (V.D. Pa. 1970); Jankowitz v. United States,
533 F.2d 538, 548 (Ct. Cl. 1976). Section 2415 has been held inapplicable only when the
cause of action could not be characterized as tort, contract or quasi-contract, and did not
fall under another part of the section. See United States v. City of Palm Beach Gardens,
635 F.2d 337, 340-41 (5th Cir.) (action for recovery of federal grant), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1081 (1981); United States v. Lutheran Medical Center, 524 F. Supp. 421, 424-26
(D. Neb. 1981) (same), affid, 680 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982); cf United States v. Hannon,
728 F.2d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 1984) (nonstatutory action on a judgment); United States v.
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The government's argument that the FWPCA's commerce clause basis
precludes application of section 2415 to section 311 cleanup actions fails
because it ignores the policy bases of section 2415.42 It also fails because
it misapplies the commerce clause. The commerce clause empowers
Congress to create certain rights of action for individuals. 3 That consti-
tutional provision does not, however, preclude application of state stat-
utes of limitations to those rights of action.' Similarly, government
rights of action based on commerce clause powers should be subject to
section 2415's time limits if they can be characterized as tort, contract or
quasi-contract. 45 Thus, the commerce clause empowers Congress to cre-
ate the right, but does not determine the character of the claim.
II. ACTIONS FOR OIL SPILL REMOVAL COSTS: TORT OR QUASI-
CONTRACT?
In characterizing the section 311 (f) cause of action, it is immediately
evident that there is no contract between the government and the pol-
luter.46 Therefore, section 2415 should apply to FWPCA actions by the
Kellum, 523 F.2d 1284, 1287 (5th Cir. 1975) (same); United States v. Johnson, 454 F.
Supp. 762, 763 (D. Idaho 1978) (same); Cracco v. Cox, 66 A.D.2d 447, 449-51, 414
N.Y.S.2d 404, 405-06 (1979) (foreclosure action).
42. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
43. Federal statutes creating rights of action for individuals have consistently been
upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 261-62 (1964) (upholding Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir.) (upholding Securities Exchange Act of 1934 damages
provision), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). See generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J.
Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 161-81 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing modern extent
of commerce clause power).
44. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal statutory rights of action are
subject to state statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S.
478, 483-85 (1980); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975);
UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp,, 383 U.S. 696, 704-05 (1966).
45. Federal courts have consistently rejected the government's commerce clause argu-
ment and applied § 2415 to federal statutory rights of action. See United States v. Cen-
tral Soya, Inc., 697 F.2d 165, 169 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. P/B STCO 213, 569 F.
Supp. 743, 744 (S.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 756 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1985);
United States v. The Barge Shamrock, 58 [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. (Mar. L. Ass'n) 1921,
1922 (D. Md. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 830 (1981). Similarly, the government's argument that no time limitation
should apply to cleanup cost actions because the FWPCA creates a new system of liabil-
ity, see supra note 23, has been rejected. See United States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d
364, 376-77 (5th Cir. 1985).
46. See United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., No. A84-108 Civil, slip op. at 11-12
(D. Alaska Nov. 8, 1984). "Usually, an essential prerequisite to the formation of [a con-
tract] is an agreement; a mutual manifestation of assent to the same terms." J. Calamari
& J. Perillo, supra note 10, § 2-1, at 22; see also 1 A. Corbin, supra note 10, § 3, at 6 (a
contract is often defined as an agreement that is enforceable at law); 1 S. Williston, A
Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1, at 2 (3d ed. 1957) ("courts have stressed the classic
concept of the agreement resulting from mutuality of assent"). Section 311 does not
require that the polluter assent before it is obligated to pay removal costs. The President
is authorized to remove the spill at any time unless he determines that the removal will be
done properly by the polluter. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1) (1982).
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United States for cleanup costs only if the cause of action can be charac-
terized as either tort or quasi-contract. 47
A. The Nature of Tort Recovery
Some district courts have held that a government action for cleanup
costs under section 311(f) is founded on tort.48 One court49 relied on a
Seventh Circuit case5° that applied the three year statute of limitations to
a government action under section 16 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899, which allows the government to recover for damage to structures
built by the United States for the preservation and improvement of its
navigable waters.5 That reliance was misplaced. In the Seventh Circuit
case, the government sued for damage to government-owned property.5 2
Section 311(f) provides no recovery for government property damage;53
it allows the government to recover money expended on behalf of the
polluter.54
Confusion arises from section 311(f)'s use of language of tort in
47. Section 2415 also provides limitations for certain claims brought by the United
States on behalf of Native Americans, 28 U.S.C.A. § 24 15(a), (b) (West Supp. June 1984),
and for actions of the United States for the recovery of money erroneously paid to or on
behalf of government employees and members of the uniformed services, id. § 2415(d)
(West 1978). Neither of these provisions is applicable to government actions for oil spill
removal costs.
48. See United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., No. A84-108 Civil, slip op. at 11-12
(D. Alaska Nov. 8, 1984); United States v. The Barge Shamrock, 58 (1980] Am. Mar.
Cas. (Mar. L. Ass'n) 1921, 1924 (D. Md. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1108
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981).
49. See United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., No. A84-108 Civil, slip op. at 10-1I
(D. Alaska Nov. 8, 1984).
50. See United States v. Central Soya, Inc., 697 F.2d 165, 168-69 (7th Cir. 1982).
51. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 408, 412 (1982).
52. See United States v. Central Soya, Inc., 697 F.2d 165, 166 (7th Cir. 1982).
53. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311(0(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(4) (1982),
allows the government to recover costs of restoration of natural resources damaged or
destroyed as a result of oil spills. This Note does not address whether § 2415 applies to
such recoveries or which limit of § 2415 applies.
54. The purpose of the varying time periods in § 2415 does not resolve this issue.
Congress created different time limits for tort and contract because § 2415 was intended
to resemble statutes of limitations in federal and state law for similar actions. See S. Rep.
No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2502,
2508; H.R. Rep. No. 1534, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966). One reason advanced for a
shorter state statute of limitations in tort actions is that evidence in tort actions is less
reliable and more transitory than the evidence in contract actions. See Williams, Limita-
tions Periods on Personal Injury Claims, 48 Notre Dame Law. 881, 881 (1973); Develop-
ments in Law, supra note 34, at 1192 n.148, 1193; Comment, Tort in Contract: A New
Statute of Limitations, 52 Or. L. Rev. 91, 92 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tort in Contract].
In light of this purpose, the tort period would be appropriate because the evidence is
likely to be similar to that in a tort case. It has also been suggested, however, that the
general disfavor in which personal injury actions were once held also led to the shorter
time period for many tort actions. See Developments in Low, supra note 34, at 1192
n.148; Tort in Contract, supra, at 93. Using this rationale, the tort statute of limitations
would be inappropriate because, by enacting § 311(f) of the FWPCA, Congress created a
favored remedy beyond existing tort remedies.
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describing the liability scheme" and from the tortious nature of the con-
duct leading to oil spills. s6 A spill is not, however, tortious in relation to
the federal government's right of recovery.57 Ordinarily, an act is tor-
tious in relation to a party when that act causes injury to, or invades
some interest of that party."8 If an oil spill is a tort, it is against those
whose property and persons were damaged.59 In removing an oil spill,
the government has not been directly injured; rather, it has performed a
statutory function created to protect the public from injury when a pol-
luter fails to remove its spill.
In addition, the cleanup action should not be characterized as tort be-
cause the FWPCA lacks a requirement that the government make a rea-
sonable attempt to reduce the extent of its injury. A person injured by
the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that
was avoidable by a reasonable effort or expenditure.6' Under the
55. The polluter is liable for all spills except where a discharge is caused solely by
"(A) an act of God, (B) an act of war, (C) negligence on the part of the United States
Government, or (D) an act or omission of a third party." 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(1) (1982)
(vessel owners); see also id. § 1321(0(2), (3) (same rule for owners of onshore and off-
shore facilities). The court in United States v. The Barge Shamrock focused on this lan-
guage in holding that the § 31 l(f) cause of action is tortious in nature. See 58 [1980] Am.
Mar. Cas. (Mar. L. Ass'n) 1921, 1923-24 (D. Md. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d
1108 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981); see also United States v. Dae Rim
Fishery Co., No. A84-108 Civil, slip op. at 8-9 (D. Alaska Nov. 8, 1984) (focusing on use
of language of tort throughout § 311 (f) in holding that tort limitation applies to govern-
ment actions for oil spill removal costs).
56. See United States v. City of Redwood, 640 F.2d 963, 966-70 (9th Cir. 1981);
Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 255-57 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Oswego Barge
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 321-22 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); 3 A. Sann, K. Halajian, B. Chase &
M. Chynsky, Benedict on Admiralty § 114 (7th ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Benedict
on Admiralty]; Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 Harv. Int'l L.J. 316, 347-49 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Oil Pollution]. See infra notes 58, 59 and accompanying text. The
United States District Court of Alaska held that the three year tort statute of limitations
was applicable to government suits for oil spill removal costs in part because oil spills are
torts. See United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., No. A84-108 Civil, slip op. at 8, 11 (D.
Alaska Nov. 8, 1984).
57. "[A]lthough the oil spill could be considered a tort ... the Government is not
seeking compensatory damages suffered as a result thereof." United States v. Poughkeep-
sie Hous. Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1998, slip op. at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1981); see United
States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364, 375 (5th Cir. 1985); cf United States v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 599 F. Supp. 441, 444 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (in government action to re-
cover Veterans Administration's (VA) medical care costs, triggering event was not acci-
dent which injured veteran but care and services provided by VA).
58. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § I & comments a-f, § 6 & comment a, § 7(1)
(1964); 1 J. Dooley, Modern Tort Law: Liability & Litigation § 2.01, at 10 (1977); W.
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 1,
at 5-6 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Prosser and Keeton]. "It is basic tort law that
wrong without damage does not constitute a good cause of action." McVickers v. Chesa-
peake & 0. Ry., 194 F. Supp. 848, 849 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
59. The primary purpose of a tort action is to compensate the injured party for dam-
age suffered. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 58, § 2, at 7.
60. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918(1) (1977); C. McCormick, Handbook on the
Law of Damages § 33 (1935); see S.C. Loveland, Inc. v. East West Towing, Inc., 608
F.2d 160, 168 (5th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff may not recover damages that could have been
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FWPCA, the government may recover its actual cleanup costs even
when they are unreasonable with respect to the harm threatened.6"
Because the FWPCA cleanup is not the result of a tort against the
government, and because the cleanup costs need not be reasonable, the
section 311(f) cause of action is not founded on tort. Therefore, it is
necessary to determine whether the section 311 action is quasi-
contractual.
B. The Nature of Quasi-Contractual Recovery
A statutory right of recovery is deemed to be quasi-contractual if it is a
legal obligation, not based on agreement, compelling the obligor to re-
store the value by which he was unjustly enriched.62 The nature of the
avoided by reasonable effort or expense), cert denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980); Burgess v.
M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 983 (1st Cir. 1977) Cm maritime tort, plaintiff would have to
show that oil spill removal costs were reasonable), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1978);
Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. The President Harding, 288 F.2d 288, 289-90 (2d Cir. 1961)
(defendant not liable for avoidable consequences); Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62
Cal. 2d 250, 269, 398 P.2d 129, 141, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89, 101 (1965) (owners of property
taken or damaged by government must take reasonable steps to minimize loss); Crowson
v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 367 So. 2d 417, 419 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (victim has duty to
minimize loss); Collova v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 535, 539, 99 N.W.2d
740, 743 (1959) (same); D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 3, at 186 (1973)
(plaintiff denied recovery for damages avoidable by reasonable action).
61. The United States may recover actual costs incurred in removal of oil spills. See
33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1)-(3) (1982); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 983 (1st Cir.
1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1978); United States v. Hollywood Marine, Inc., 519 F.
Supp. 688, 692 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327,
1347 (D.P.R. 1978), affid in part vacated in part on other grounds, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Beatty, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1040,
1045 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Union Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 734, 744 (Ct.
Cl. 1981). Those costs need not be reasonable. Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 456
F. Supp. 1327, 1347 (D.P.R. 1978), affid in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 628
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Beatty, Inc.,
401 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Union Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 651
F.2d 734, 744 (Ct. Cl. 1981); see Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 983 (1st Cir.
1977) (dictum), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1978). But see United States v. Malitovsky
Cooperage Co., 472 F. Supp. 454, 458 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (court satisfied that government
had established that removal costs were reasonable). Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has
pointed out that the recovery of the United States is limited to the costs of cleanup. See
United States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 1985). It is not a recovery
for compensatory damages. Id. at 375.
62. United States v. City of Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d 337, 340-41 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981); United States v. Limbs, 524 F.2d 799, 801 (9th Cir.
1975); Jankowitz v. United States, 533 F.2d 538, 548 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Corbin, Quasi-Con-
tractual Obligations, 21 Yale L.J. 533, 550 (1912); see W. Keener, A Treatise on the Law
of Quasi-Contracts 16 (1893); F. Woodward, The Law of Quasi-Contracts § 1 (1913).
Common law quasi-contractual recovery is based on the principle that a person should
not be allowed to be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. See Gulf Oil Trading
Co. v. Creole Supply, 596 F.2d 515, 520 (2d Cir. 1979); Franks v. Lockwood, 146 Conn.
273, 278, 150 A.2d 215, 218 (1959); Mehl v. Norton, 201 Minn. 203, 204-05, 275 N.W.
843, 844 (1937); Duffy v. Scott, 235 Wis. 142, 149-50, 292 N.W. 273, 276 (1940); Restate-
ment of Restitution §§ 1, 3 (1936); W. Keener, supra, at 19; 1 G. Palmer, The Law of
Restitution § 1.1, at 2-6 (1978); F. Woodward, supra, § 3; cf McGrath v. Hilding, 41
N.Y.2d 625, 629, 363 N.E.2d 328, 331, 394 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606 (1977) (applying same
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section 311 (f) cause of action should be characterized as quasi-contrac-
tual because the government cleanup activities unjustly enrich the pol-
luter by performing the polluter's duty under federal and state law to
remove the spill.
A person who performs another's duty to protect public safety, with
the expectation of compensation, is entitled to restitution from the
other. 63 Section 311 empowers the United States to perform a polluter's
duty to remove oil spilled by the polluter," and its creation of an action
to recover costs gives rise to expectation of compensation.
This duty to remove the spill arises from both state and federal law.
Under common law, a person who has performed an act that he later
realizes or should realize has created an unreasonable risk of harm to
another has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the harm from
occurring. s The duty exists whether 66 or not67 the conduct creating the
principle to constructive trusts). The unjust enrichment can arise both when a person
gains property and when a person is saved from expense or loss. 3105 Grand Corp. v.
City of New York, 288 N.Y. 178, 181, 42 N.E.2d 475, 476-77 (1942); see 1 G. Palmer,
supra, § 1.8 (Supp. 1982); cf. J. Dawson, Unjust Enrichment 22 (1951) ("in the United
States. . . there are no distinctions based on the form or nature of the gain received").
Unlike a contract, which is a consensual arrangement, see supra note 46, a quasi-contract
can arise against even a clear expression of dissent, United States v. Neidorf,. 522 F.2d
916, 918 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); see 1 A. Corbin, supra note
10, § 19, at 46; cf D. Dobbs, supra note 60, § 4.2, at 234-35 (in a quasi-contract, "there is
nothing like a contract between the parties," express or implied).
63. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967); United
States v. Consolidated Edison Co., 452 F. Supp. 638, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), modified on
other grounds, 580 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1978); W. Keener, supra note 62, at 341; 2 G.
Palmer, supra note 62, § 10.4, at 377 (1978); Restatement of Restitution § 115 (1936); F.
Woodward, supra note 62, § 193, at 310; see also Brandon Township v. Jerome Builders,
Inc., 80 Mich. App. 180, 182-83, 263 N.W.2d 326, 327-28 (1977) (when defendant re-
fused to repair its dam, thus endangering the public, the court cited Restatement of Resti-
tution § 115 (1936) in allowing plaintiff township recovery of repair costs); New York v.
Schenectady Chemicals, Inc., 103 A.D.2d 33, 34, 38-39, 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1011-12,
1014 (1984) (court cited Restatement of Restitution § 115 (1936) in allowing state to
recover costs of cleaning up waste disposal site).
64. The polluter has a duty to remove its oil spill. See United States v. P/B STCO
213, 756 F.2d 364, 368-70 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 736 F.2d
180, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. The Barge Shamrock, 635 F.2d 1108, 1110
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981); United States v. Healy Tibbitts Constr.
Co., No. C-83-3072, slip op. at 5-6 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 1984); United States v. Poughkeep-
sie Hous. Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1998, slip op. at 14 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1981); ef
Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 619 (4th Cir. 1979) (referring
to polluter's responsibility to remove).
65. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 321 (1964); see Hollinbeck v. Downey, 261
Minn. 481, 485-86, 113 N.W.2d 9, 12 (1962) (duty to warn of golf ball on golf range).
66. See Bangor & A.R.R. v. The Ship Fernview, 455 F. Supp. 1043, 1061 (D. Me.
1978); Carter v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 341 F. Supp. 628, 630 (E.D. La. 1972),
afl'dper curiam, 470 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1973); Trombley v. Kolts, 29 Cal. App. 2d 699,
708, 85 P.2d 541, 545-46 (1938); Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 221 N.C. 292, 299,
20 S.E.2d 299, 303-04 (1942); Prosser and Keeton, supra note 58, § 56, at 377.
67. See Hardy v. Brooks, 103 Ga. App. 124, 127, 118 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1961); Zylka v.
Leikvoll, 274 Minn. 435, 447, 144 N.W.2d 358, 367 (1966); Hollinbeck v. Downey, 261
Minn. 481, 485-86, 113 N.W.2d 9, 11-12 (1962); Chandler v. Forsyth Royal Crown Bot-
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danger was negligent. A person breaching this duty is negligent.68 Oil
spills create risk of harm to persons and property. 9 This risk imposes a
duty on the polluter to remove the oil in order to protect others from
injury. The duty to remove oil spills also arises from state water pollu-
tion statutes which expressly require polluters to remove oil spilled into
the waters of the state.7"
The final source of the duty to clean up oil spills arises from the
FWPCA itself. Section 311(b)(3) prohibits any discharge of oil or haz-
ardous substances into the waters of the United States," Section
311(c)(1) empowers the United States to remove oil spills only if the pol-
luter will not do it properly.72 These provisions indicate Congress' inten-
tion that polluters remove their own spills, if possible.73 The legislative
history of section 311 clearly shows such an intent.74 In effect, the stat-
ute tells polluters that if they do not remove their own spills, the United
States will do the job and send the bill to the polluters. Therefore, pol-
luters have a duty to remove oil spills for which they are responsible.75
tling Co., 257 N.C. 245, 249-50, 125 S.E.2d 584, 587 (1962); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 321 comment a (1964); Prosser and Keeton, supra note 58, § 56, at 377. But see
Morrison & Woods, An Examination of the Duty Concept: Has it Evolved in Otis Engi-
neering v. Clark?, 36 Baylor L. Rev. 375, 388 (1984) (where a person's prior conduct was
not negligent, the courts are split on whether there is an affirmative duty to act).
68. "Negligent conduct may be... a failure to do an act which is necessary for the
protection or assistance of another and which the actor is under a duty to do." Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 284 (1964).
69. See supra note 3.
70. See Alaska Stat. § 46.04.020 (1982); Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 6204 (1983); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 376.09(1) (West Supp. 1984); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 548 (West Supp.
1984); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 323.337 (West 1975); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.84(a)
(1983); S.C. Code Ann. § 4843-560(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Tex. Water Code Ann.
§ 26.266(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 90.48.325 (Supp. 1985).
Some states allow an agency to order polluters to remove their spills. See Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 25-8-606 (1982); Mont. Code Ann. § 75-5-601 (1983); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 58.10-
23.1If(a) (West 1982); Va. Code § 62.1-44.34:3B (1982).
71. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1982).
72. See id § 1321(c)(1); United States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364, 370 (5th Cir.
1985).
73. See United States v. The Barge Shamrock, 635 F.2d 1108, 1110 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981).
74. "'The object of this provision is to make the discharger completely responsible
for cleaning up the discharged oil and preventing or lessening potential damage. .... ""
United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 796, 799 (E.D. La. 1983) (quoting S.
Rep. No. 351, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1969)), aff'd, 736 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1984); see S.
Rep. No. 351, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1969) (it is intended that polluters be encouraged
to remove their discharges); Conf. Rep. No. 940, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in
1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2691, 2723 (although the President has a responsibil-
ity to remove, the polluter is not to be inhibited); 115 Cong. Rec. 28,957 (1969) (state-
ment of Sen. Boggs) (it is intended that polluters remove their discharges).
75. See United States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 1985). It has
been suggested that the government cleanup unjustly enriches the polluter by reducing its
liability to private parties and to the states. See United States v. Poughkeepsie Hous.
Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1998, slip op. at 14 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1981). This argument
may go beyond traditional common law theories of quasi-contractual recovery.
Although oil spills can create potential liability to private persons under theories of coin-
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One court has held that an action for cleanup costs is not quasi-con-
mon law nuisance, see Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 259-60 (9th Cir. 1973);
Louisiana v. M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170, 1173-74 (E.D. La. 1981), af'd, 728 F.2d
748 (5th Cir. 1984), affid on reh'g, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Burgess v.
M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 249-50 (D. Me. 1973); In re New Jersey Barging Corp.,
168 F. Supp. 925, 934-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); 3 Benedict on Admiralty, supra note 56,
§ 114, at 9-104 to - 105; Oil Pollution, supra note 56, at 348; Kalo, Water Pollution and
Commercial Fishermen: Applying General Maritime Law to Claimsfor Damages to Fisher-
ies in Ocean and Coastal Waters, 61 N.C.L. Rev. 313, 327-31 (1983); see generally Davis,
Theories of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wis. L. Rev. 738, 749-52 (reviewing use of
nuisance doctrine in water pollution litigation), and negligence, see 3 Benedict on Admi-
ralty, supra note 56, § 114, at 9-102 to -103; Oil Pollution, supra note 56, at 348; see
generally Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 155, 170-80 (1968)
(discussing problems of proof in oil spill negligence actions), to states for public nuisance,
see In re Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 321-22 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), affid in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981); Kalo, supra, at 328; cf Cali-
fornia v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 926 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (public nuisance
analysis in maritime case), and under state statutes imposing liability beyond the
FWPCA's limits, see Ala. Code § 22-22-9(p) (1984) (damages, including cleanup costs);
Alaska Stat. § 46.04.010 (1984) (state may recover cleanup costs); Cal. Harb. & Nay.
Code § 293 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985) (full damages); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-451(a)
(1983) (full cleanup costs, 150% liability if negligence shown); Del. Code Ann. tit. 7,
§§ 6204, 6205 (1983) (cleanup costs); Ga. Code § 12-5-51(a) (1982) (all costs, expenses
and injuries); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 224.110 (1982) (all costs of fish and wildlife replacement);
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 30:1073.B.(1), :1096.A.(I) (West Supp. 1985) (damages for viola-
tion of pollution laws); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 552.2 (West 1978) (removal costs
and damages); Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 8-1408 (1983) (all cleanup and restoration
costs); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 323.337(2) (West 1975) (full removal costs); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 204.096 (Vernon 1983) (actual damages including restoration of waters); Mont.
Code Ann. § 75-5-635 (1983) (costs of investigation, removal and restoration); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 146-A:9, -A:10 (1978) (all cleanup costs); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 58:10-
23.1If(a), .1lg(b), .1lg(c) (West 1982) (on refusal by polluter to remove, three times
state's removal costs; otherwise, removal costs up to $50,000,000 per facility or $150 per
gross ton per vessel); N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 71-1941 (McKinney 1984) (full costs of
removal and restoration); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 34A-2-96 (Supp. 1984) (contain-
ment and recovery costs); Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-3-116(c) (1983) (damages, including
investigation, removal and restoration); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1283(c) (Supp. 1984)
(cleanup costs); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 90.48.335 (Supp. 1985) (cleanup costs); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 147.23 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (costs of removing adverse environmental
effects), and to states and private persons under federal maritime jurisdiction, see Puerto
Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 672 (1st Cir. 1980) (state), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981); Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 257 (9th Cir. 1973) (private
persons); In re Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 315-18 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (state),
affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981); Maryland v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1063-65 (D. Md. 1972) (state); American Wa-
terways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241, 1245 (M.D. Fla. 1971) (three judge
court) (state), rev'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 325 (1973); California v. S.S. Bourne-
mouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 924-26 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (state); Annot., 10 A.L.R. Fed. 956,
957-58 (1972) (state); see generally Kalo, supra, at 318-31 (analysis of water pollution as
maritime tort); Sweeney, supra, at 164-69 (reviewing possible remedies for oil pollution),
there appears to be no basis in common law for quasi-contractual recovery based on
prevention of these liabilities.
One court has addressed this issue. See Seaboard Shipping Corp. v. Jocharanne Tug-
boat Corp., 461 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1972). In that case, the plaintiff, an insurance com-
pany, sought recovery of money spent to salvage a gasoline barge that had gone aground.
Id. at 502. The court considered whether the defendant, another insurer of the barge,
was unjustly benefited by plaintiff having removed the threat of an explosion for which
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tractual because the primary duty to remove oil spills rests with the Pres-
ident and that it would therefore be legally impossible for the polluter's
enrichment to be unjust.76 The President's duty, however, is a secondary
one. Section 311 authorizes the President to remove the spill unless he
determines that the spill will be removed properly by the polluter.'" If
the President determines that the polluter will properly remove the spill,
the FWPCA's authorization disappears. Therefore, the section 311
cleanup is a function exercised by the government when the polluter fails
to perform its primary duty to remove the spill. The polluter's duty is
not eliminated. 7
It has been suggested that because the FWNVPCA benefits the public and
not the polluter, the government's claim for cleanup costs is not quasi-
contractual in nature.79 This reasoning fails because a person whose
duty to the public has been performed by another has been unjustly en-
riched."0 The FWPCA forces polluters to repay the United States for
this enrichment. This enrichment provides the basis for characterizing
the section 311 cleanup cause of action as quasi-contractual for the pur-
defendant might be liable. Ia at 504-05. The court, however, found that under the terms
of the insurance policy, the defendant had contracted out of any such liability. Id. at 505.
Thus, the court did not reach the issue of whether the defendant could have been unjustly
enriched by virtue of prevention of potential liability. Id£
76. See United States v. The Barge Shamrock, 58 [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. (Mar. L.
Ass'n) 1921, 1923 n.2 (D. Md. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981). The court did not explain its reasoning. Per-
haps it is based on the principle that a volunteer is generally not entitled to restitution.
See G. Douthwaite, Attorney's Guide to Restitution § 1.4, at 23-24 (1977); Restatement
of Restitution § 112 (1936); cf. City of Albany v. McNamara, 117 N.Y. 168, 171-72 22
N.E. 931, 932 (1889) (city government was not entitled to restitution at common law for
relief payments voluntarily made). See generally Graham, Public Assistance: The Right
to Receive; The Obligation to Repay, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 451, 475-79 (1968) (reviewing
common law rule against restitution in public assistance context). This reasoning is inap-
posite because
[a] person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by him
but which as between himself and another should have been discharged by the
other, is entitled to indemnity from the other, unless the payor is barred by the
wrongful nature of his conduct.
Restatement of Restitution § 76 (1936); see State v. Stewart's Ice Cream Co., 64 N.Y.2d
83, 87-88, 473 N.E.2d 1184, 1186-87, 484 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812 (1984) (citing Restatement
of Restitution § 76 (1936)) (applying New York's statute of limitations for contracts im-
plied in law to state action for oil spill removal costs under state statute).
77. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1) (1982); United States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364,
370 (5th Cir. 1985).
78. "[The Act] nowhere relieves the owner of the discharging vessel of his responsibil-
ity to clean up the discharge from his vessel in violation of the AcL" United States v.
Dixie Carriers, Inc., 736 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1984); see United States v. P/B STCO
213, 756 F.2d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Healy Tibbitts Constr. Co., No.
C-83-3072, slip op. at 5-6 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 1984); United States v. Poughkeepsie Hous.
Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1998, slip op. at 14 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1981).
79. See United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., No. A84-108 Civil, slip op. at 9-10 (D.
Alaska Nov. 8, 1984); United States v. P/B STCO 213, 569 F. Supp. 743, 744 (S.D. Tex.
1983), rev'd, 756 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1985).
80. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
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poses of the section 2415 statute of limitations.8'
CONCLUSION
Oil pollution caused by spills is a pressing problem. The United States
can best abate this problem by promptly enforcing anti-pollution laws,
including section 311 (f) of the FWPCA. Applying section 2415 to gov-
ernment suits to recover cleanup costs best implements the expressed
congressional purposes for creating the statute of limitations: fairness
and economy. The three year statute of limitations of section 2415(b) is
inappropriate because oil spills, although arguably tortious acts, are not
tortious with respect to the government's cause of action under section
311(f) of the FWPCA. Because government cleanups unjustly enrich
polluters by performing the polluter's duty to remove oil spills, section
311(f) actions are quasi-contractual in nature and should therefore be
governed by the six year limitations period of section 2415(a).
Robert E. Maher, Jr.
8 1. It has been suggested that the cleanup cause of action is not quasi-contractual for
limitations purposes because there is no agreement between the users of public waters and
the United States. See United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., No. A84-108 Civil, slip op.
at 9 (D. Alaska Nov. 8, 1984). This is incorrect because quasi-contractual liability can
exist in the absence of an agreement. See supra note 62. That same court also suggested
that there is no quasi-contract because § 311 allows the United States to recover the costs
of removal, not the value of the services to the polluter. See Dae Rim Fishery, slip op. at
9. This reasoning fails because a party is entitled to recover the costs incurred in per-
forming another's duty to protect public health and safety. See supra notes 63-64 and
accompanying text.
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